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Abstract
The dissertation focuses on the incentives and economic effects of gross receipts taxes
(GRTs) versus corporate income taxes (CITs). Conventional wisdom holds that GRTs
are very poor tax instruments; however, several states have shown renewed interest
in GRTs since 2002. An interesting question to ask is why states are reconsidering
GRTs in spite of all criticisms. Are GRTs really as bad as what conventional wisdom
says? There is little rigorous theoretical or empirical work on GRTs. My dissertation
aims to help fill this gap by providing both theoretical and empirical analysis on the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of GRTs versus CITs.
Essay one provides the first systematic theoretical analysis to compare and
contrast the incentives and economic effects of gross receipts taxes versus corporate
income taxes. Specifically, it focuses on the incentives for vertical integration in
the sense of make-or-buy decisions, the effects on profit shifting between out-of-state
and in-state firms, the incentives to change organizational form for tax purposes,
and the incentives for cost-saving innovation under each tax system. Several results
contradict conventional wisdom and deepen our understanding of GRTs. Based on
Essay one, Essay two empirically tests the theoretical prediction that GRTs eliminate
the distortion on organizational form choice, increasing the chance for a firm to
incorporate. The analysis uses state-industry panel data from Nonemployer Statistics
during the period 2002- 2008. The results show that states with a GRT have a higher
share of corporate firms. Further, by replacing the CIT with a GRT, states may
promote the real activity of C corporations.
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Chapter 1
A New Look at Gross Receipts
Taxes: A Theoretical Analysis
1.1

Introduction

How to tax business has been and will always be a question at the center of tax
policy debates. Several researchers have argued that the ideal subnational business
tax vehicle is an origin-based value added tax.1 However, this has not proven to be
politically possible in the US, especially at the state level.2 Instead, states choose
between corporate income taxes (CITs) which tax the profits of certain companies
and gross receipts taxes (GRTs) which tax the gross revenues of all transactions
within the state.3 Both types of taxes may distort economic behavior. According to
the conventional wisdom, CITs influence firms’ choices on location, investment, and
organizational form; while GRTs cause tax pyramiding, encourage artificial vertical
1

See Oakland and Testa (1996) for details.
New Hampshire is the only state that currently has a business enterprise tax very similar to
a value added tax (VAT). Michigan has recently phased out its VAT-like Single Business Tax and
many other states have considered but failed to adopt a VAT.
3
States have also considered net receipts taxes. The California Commission on the 21st Century
Economy recently proposed a Business Net Receipts Tax. In general, GRTs do not allow deductions
for input costs, but net receipts taxes allow deductions for certain non-labor inputs.
2

1

integration, and alter the prices of intermediate inputs. GRTs are viewed as especially
poor tax vehicles among most tax economists.
Over the past several decades, there has been a significant trend for states to move
towards a single-sales factor apportionment for CITs, which means the tax burdens
are apportioned across states on the basis of gross receipts. At the same time, states
have begun showing renewed interest in using GRTs directly as the instruments to tax
business, in spite of the criticisms. Whether to replace the current tax structure with
a GRT structure is at the center of heated policy debates concerning the direction of
state fiscal systems. Nevertheless, little has been done to systematically analyze GRTs
as a replacement for CITs. This paper is the first to provide a careful theoretical study
of the relative performance of GRTs versus CITs from several interesting perspectives.
Unlike a corporate income tax, which applies only to corporations with positive
profits, a gross receipts tax generally applies to all business entities, including regular
corporations, S corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships.4 States last embraced GRTs during the Great Depression in order
to generate enough revenue to keep key government services functioning. In the wake
of strong criticisms, state use of GRTs declined in the latter half of the twentieth
century. By 2002, only Delaware and Washington imposed significant gross receipts
taxes.5 However, instead of fading away, since 2002 six states, Kentucky, Michigan,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and Texas, have levied certain forms of GRT, and five
other states, California, Illinois, Maine, Montana, and Rhode Island, have considered
modified GRTs.6 An interesting question to ask is why states adopted GRTs if they
are such poor tax instruments.
There has been little theoretical and empirical literature on GRTs, although
GRTs have generated a lot of discussion, mostly highlighting the long–standing
4

By definition, a corporate income tax applies to C corporations, but some states have extended
the tax to S corporations and limited liability companies.
5
New Mexico’s GRT is better viewed as a broad-based sales tax.
6
Kentucky and New Jersey used gross receipts as an alternative minimum assessment in their
corporate income tax structure. See Appendix B for more details. Oklahoma just imposed a modified
GRT in 2010.
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criticisms of GRTs based on standard principles of taxation—economic neutrality,
competitiveness, fairness, and transparency (McLure, 2005a 2005b; Mikesell, 2007a
2007b; Chamberlain and Fleenor, 2006).

Two recent papers provide valuable

discussions on advantages and disadvantages of GRTs over alternative taxes. Testa
and Mattoon (2007) summarize the advantages and disadvantages of GRTs along
three dimensions—as a stand alone tax against standard tax principles, as a
replacement for an existing business tax, and as a corrective “fill–in” tax to rebalance
a state’s tax system. They conclude that an origin-based value added tax is the
first-best choice, not a GRT. Pogue (2007) argues that a GRT is one way to move
towards a less complicated tax that applies to more forms of business organization and
more sectors of the economy, however, a GRT is not an ideal business tax because
gross receipts do not reflect the social costs of their business activities well. Alm,
Blackwell, and McKee (2004) take a different approach by examining the tax audit
and tax compliance behavior associated with the GRT in New Mexico. Because New
Mexico’s GRT is better viewed as a broad-based sales tax, the analysis is in the
framework of firm compliance with sales taxes.
In general, criticisms of GRTs do not consider characteristics of the market
structure and arrangements of corporate profits. In addition, many of the evaluations
of GRTs are not carefully considered in relation to what they are replacing. Given that
we are not living in the first-best world, GRTs should not be evaluated entirely from
a standpoint of an ideal world and the analysis should focus more on the comparative
disadvantages and advantages in relation to feasible alternatives. Regardless of all
critiques, GRTs have been recently enacted or considered in a number of states,
indicating a perceived need for an alternative approach to business taxation. The
question addressed in this paper is how GRTs perform relative to the CITs that they
often replace.
To carefully examine the potential effects of GRTs, this paper constructs
theoretical models to compare and contrast the incentives and economic effects

3

of a corporate income tax with a single sales factor versus gross receipts taxes.7
Specifically, a basic model is constructed and then extended to examine various
aspects of GRTs to explore differential incentives under a GRT versus a CIT. This
allows me to look at different facets of the problem, particularly the incentive for
vertical integration in the sense of make-or-buy decisions, the effect on profit shifting
between out-of-state and in-state firms, the incentive to change organizational form
for tax purposes, and the incentive for cost-saving innovation. I then investigate the
influence of different market structures and the role that bargaining power between
the upstream and downstream firms plays in the analysis. The purpose of this paper
is to understand the relative impacts of GRTs versus CITs and to investigate whether
GRTs offer any potential benefits. Interestingly, this paper shows that GRTs are not
as bad as the conventional wisdom says and in some cases, GRTs actually result in a
reverse of what has often been argued.
First of all, GRTs do not always create different incentives for vertical integration
than those under CITs. If firms prefer making their own inputs to buying from the
upstream firm under a GRT, they would also do so under a CIT. However, in some
cases, firms would prefer buying the inputs under a GRT but making their own inputs
under a CIT. Hence, rather than encouraging vertical integration, as other researchers
have claimed, GRTs might actually reduce the incentive for vertical integration.
Furthermore, GRTs make it possible to shift profits from out-of state firms
to in-state firms.

In a model where two states initially have single-sales factor

apportionment CITs, the home state can transfer profits from out-of-state upstream
manufacturers to in-state retailers when the home state replaces the CIT with a GRT.
In addition, GRTs help eliminate the distortion on organizational form choice
arising under CITs and possibly lower the prices of final goods. GRTs do not create
the incentive for firms to be non-corporate entities for tax purposes. Specifically,
under a CIT, firms may choose to be S corporations, LLCs, or other pass-through
7

By 2008, eleven states used a single sales factor apportionment formula and several other states
applied more than equal weight to the sales factor. In general, most CIT states are moving towards
a single sales factor apportionment formula.
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entities instead of C corporations to avoid the tax, but they are not able to do so
under GRTs since all companies are subject to the tax. Furthermore, given the benefit
of easier access to capital markets for many C corporations, prices of the final goods
might be even lower under a GRT if non-corporate entities find it favorable to become
C corporations. Consequently, GRTs do not necessarily lead to higher prices of the
final goods than CITs.
On the other hand, GRTs create less incentives for cost-saving innovation than
CITs. GRTs reduce firms’ effective marginal benefit of investment on innovation while
CITs reduce the gross marginal benefit and marginal cost at the same time, leaving
the effective marginal benefit unchanged. As a result, firms have less incentive to
innovate under GRTs than under CITs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a basic
model framework for the analysis. Section 3 explores the incentives to integrate
along the vertical chain under a GRT versus under a CIT. Section 4 examines profit
shifting from out-of-state firms to in-state firms when the home state replaces a
CIT with a GRT. Section 5 extends the model to explore the incentive to change
organizational form and the associated economic impacts. Section 6 investigates
the incentive to invest in cost-saving innovations. Section 7 studies the impact of
varying the downstream market structure on previous results. Section 8 discusses how
different distributions of bargaining power between the upstream and downstream
firms could change the results. Section 9 offers a brief conclusion with a discussion of
limitations and possible future research.

1.2

The Model Framework

The general setup of the baseline model is as follows.8 Consider a model where the
upstream monopoly firm produces an intermediate good and sells to a downstream
8

The model is based on a standard model in the vertical integration literature. See Tirole (1988)
for further discussion.
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monopoly firm.9 Denote the price for the intermediate good as W . Let cup be the
upstream monopoly’s marginal cost of producing the intermediate good. Assume the
downstream firm buys the input only from the upstream monopoly and sells the final
good at price P . For simplicity, the marginal cost of processing the intermediate
good to the final good is zero, and each unit of the final good requires one unit of the
intermediate good. This assumption is relaxed in later modifications of the model.
The demand for the final good is linear, P = 1 − q. In addition, it is assumed that
it is not practical for either the downstream firm or the upstream firm to merge into
one firm.
Without a tax, the downstream firm solves the following problem:

M ax (1 − q)q − W q.

(1.1)

q

The solution from the first order condition is q N T =

1−W
,
2

which is the demand for

the intermediate good, where the superscript N T denotes the no-tax case.
The upstream firm maximizes its profit:

M ax (W − cup )q N T .
W

(1.2)

The first order condition yields,
W NT =

1+cup
,
2

and thus, the price of the downstream good,
P NT =
9

3+cup
.
4

For simplicity, I assume the upstream monopoly only produces one intermediate good here,
however, the monopoly could produce several goods and as long as the goods are unrelated, it would
not affect the nature of the problem.

6

The framework above provides the basic structure of the model assuming no tax
on businesses. In the analyses below, I look at the cases under two tax regimes, a
CIT and a GRT, and compare the results under the two tax systems. Furthermore,
model assumptions, including the assumptions on market structure, marginal cost of
production, and other aspects, are later relaxed, and the model is modified in various
ways to examine different aspects of relative impacts of GRTs versus CITs.

1.3

Incentives for Vertical Integration

The incentive to vertically integrate has been one of the biggest concerns in the
discussion on GRTs. The major argument is that GRTs tax gross revenues at each
stage of the production process, creating extra layers of taxation along the supply
chain, a phenomenon called tax pyramiding. The conventional wisdom argues that
GRTs create an incentive for vertical integration. However, most of the criticism
does not carefully consider the market structure and how firms along the supply
chain respond to each other. What happens if GRTs affect firms’ pricing behavior
along the supply chain?
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important to clarify the type of vertical
integration addressed in the paper. Vertical integration generally refers to the process
in which several steps in the production and/or distribution of a product or service
are controlled by a single company or entity. The most familiar form of vertical
integration is the merging together of two businesses that are at different stages of
production —for example, the merger between Time Warner Incorporated, a major
cable operation, and Turner Corporation, which produces CNN, TBS, and other
programming. In this case, vertical integration is the degree to which a firm owns
its upstream suppliers and/or its downstream buyers. However, there is another
form of vertical integration. A firm can integrate different stages of the production
process into its own production and perform the upstream supplier’s activity itself
without buying the upstream firm. For instance, Toshiba, a global company producing
7

electronic products, generally uses its own batteries rather than buying from other
firms because it is cheaper to do so. However, as a counterexample, Haixin, a Chinese
TV producer, generally buys the chips from Toshiba since Toshiba produces the chips
on a large scale and enjoys economies of scale. It is much cheaper for Haixin to
buy instead of make. This paper focuses on the latter type of vertical integration.
Specifically, it explores how the make-or-buy decision differs for the downstream firm
under a GRT versus under a CIT.
The analysis first looks at “make” and “buy” cases under both tax systems and
then compares the results under both taxes for the “make” and “buy” cases. Begin
with the “buy” case. With a CIT at rate t, firms solve the following problems: the
downstream firm maximizes net profit, M ax (1 − t)[(1 − q)q − W q], yielding output
q

q

CIT

; the upstream firm then solves M ax (1 − t)(W q CIT − cup q CIT ).10 Comparing
W

these problems with (1.1) and (1.2) in the baseline model, one can see that the
objective functions under a CIT are simply multiples of the no-tax ones. Therefore,
a CIT does not distort firms’ decisions and the solutions are the same as those in the
no-tax case.
Now suppose that instead of a CIT the state government imposes a GRT at
the tax rate t on gross receipts.11 The downstream firm maximizes the after-tax
profit, M ax (1 − t)(1 − q)q − W q, and the resulting output level is denoted q GRT . The
q

upstream firm’s problem is M ax (1 − t)W q GRT − cup q GRT . Solving the maximization
W

problems yields
W GRT =

1−t
2

+

cup
,
2(1−t)

and
P GRT =

3
4

+

cup
.
4(1−t)2

Comparing these to W N T and P N T , one can prove the following result.
10
11

Assume all goods are sold in one state.
The result is also robust to the revenue-neutral GRT rate.

8

Lemma 1. As long as the after-tax price of the final good under a GRT is greater
than the cost of the intermediate good, a GRT drives up the price of the final good but
lowers the price of the intermediate good.
Proof Given that (1 − t)P > cup , and P < 1, it must be true that 1 − t > cup .12
Subtracting the two equilibrium input prices yields
W N T − W GRT =

t
1 − t − cup
·
> 0.
1−t
2

Subtracting the two equilibrium final good prices yields
P GRT − P N T =

t
(2 − t)cup
·
> 0.
(1 − t)2
4


Given that the GRT reduces the input price, it potentially impacts the downstream
firm’s decision to make or buy.13 For the “make” case, assume that the downstream
firm can make its own input at a constant marginal cost cdown > cup .14 If it makes
its own input, the problem becomes M ax (1 − t)(1 − q)q − cdown q with a GRT and
q

M ax (1 − t)[(1 − q)q − c
q

down

q] with a CIT. Finally, comparing the marginal cost of

making the input with that of buying the input under both tax systems, along with
the associated profit differences yields the following result.
12

The condition for profitability is (1 − t)2 > cup . If firms earn any positive profits, 1 − t > cup
will be automatically satisfied.
13
Lemma 1 still holds even in the presence of the federal corporate income tax (tfc ). In this case,
under a CIT, downstream firm’s objective function becomes M ax (1 − tfc )(1 − t)[(1 − q)q − W q],
q

while upstream firm’s one becomes M ax (1 − tfc )(1 − t)(W q CIT − cup q CIT ). The solutions under the
W

CIT would be the same as if there is no federal corporate income tax. Under a GRT, with the federal
corporate income tax, the downstream’s problem is: M ax (1 − t)(1 − q)q − W q − tfc [(1 − q)q − W q],
q

while the upstream firm’s one is: M ax (1 − t)W q GRT − cup q GRT −tfc (W q GRT − cup q GRT ). As long
W

as firms make any positive profits under a GRT, the results, P GRT > P CIT and W GRT < W CIT ,
will always be true. The proof is similar to the one above.
14
Otherwise, the downstream firm would not think of buying from other firms.

9

Proposition 1 There exist situations in which the downstream firm makes its
own input under a CIT but buys under a GRT, but there do not exist situations
under which the downstream firm makes under a GRT but buys under a CIT.
Proof Recall from Lemma 1 that W GRT < W N T for any positive profits, and that
the equilibrium intermediate good price is W N T under a CIT. If cdown < W GRT , then
the firm makes its own input under both tax regimes. If W GRT < cdown < W N T , the
downstream firm makes the intermediate good under a CIT but buys the intermediate
good under a GRT. Although it is cheaper to buy the input under a GRT, since
making the input can eliminate the double marginalization, a check is necessary to
guarantee that buying the input results in a higher net profit than making its own
under the GRT. Using the solutions from the maximization problems, the after-tax
GRT
profits in both make and buy cases under the GRT are: πbuy
=
GRT
πmake
=

[1−t−cdown ]2
4(1−t)

[(1−t)2 −cup ]2
16(1−t)3

and

. The condition W GRT < cdown can be rearranged to yield
2(1 − t − cdown ) <

(1−t)2 −cup
.
1−t

Then, the following is true:
GRT
πbuy

1
·
=
16(1 − t)



[(1 − t)2 − cup ]
(1 − t)

2
>


2
1
GRT
· 2(1 − t − cdown ) = πmake
.
16(1 − t)

Thus, the downstream firm would rather buy the input from the upstream firm than
make the input. If W N T < cdown , the firm buys under both tax regimes. As in the
previous case, I need to compare the net profits in both make and buy cases under
up

down

CIT
CIT
the CIT, that is, πbuy
= (1 − t)( 1−c4 )2 and πmake
= (1 − t)( 1−c2

W N T < cdown can be rearranged to yield
1 − cup
1 − cdown
>
.
4
2

10

)2 . The condition

Therefore,
CIT
πbuy
= (1 − t) · (

1 − cdown 2
1 − cup 2
CIT
) > (1 − t) · (
) = πmake
.
4
2


Conceptually, the most common criticism on GRTs is the incentive for vertical
integration. Nevertheless, the analysis above shows that this might not be true when
considering characteristics of the market structure and how GRTs influence firms’
pricing decision for the intermediate good. Instead of providing a greater incentive
to vertically integrate, a GRT provides less incentive when it drives down the price
of the input to the point that it is cheaper to buy than make its own. This result
contradicts the conventional wisdom and calls for careful investigation of the effects of
GRTs. Whether this result still holds in other market structures raises a question and
is explored in Section 7 which focuses on the impact of varying downstream market
structure on the results.

1.4

Profit Shifting

The decline of CIT revenue and its well-known distortions on investments and location
choices push states to look for alternative ways to tax businesses. When it comes to
enacting a new tax to replace the existing one, policy makers must consider how
businesses react to the policy change. Particularly, when transactions involve firms
located in different states, it is necessary for the state government to bear in mind
how in-state firms would be affected by the new tax. The question remains why states
have begun showing renewed interest in a GRT, although the tax has been criticized
for a long time as a poor tax instrument. A first glimpse of GRTs seems to suggest
that the input price for in-state firms increases due to tax pyramiding. Nevertheless,
as shown in Lemma 1, the price of the intermediate good is actually lower under a
GRT than a CIT. One might ponder how the tax change would affect upstream and
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downstream firms differently. What are the implications for the distribution of profits
across states when the upstream and downstream firms are located in different states?
To answer these questions, the baseline model is slightly modified. Consider two
states, state 1 and state 2, where state 1 is the home state where the final goods are
sold. The upstream monopoly manufacturer is in state 2, which produces the goods
at a constant marginal cost, cup , and sells products to the monopoly retailer in state
1. Initially, both states have a single sales factor apportionment corporate income
tax.15 Both upstream and downstream firms are taxable entities under a CIT.
With a CIT, the problems for the upstream and downstream firms are the same
as in (1.1) and (1.2). To see how GRTs might influence the market differently from
the perspective of the home state, assume the home state government enacts a GRT
to replace the CIT, which generates the same tax revenue as before at a tax rate
tGRT . The downstream and upstream firms maximize the after-tax profits similar to
those in the previous section. The maximization solutions yield W GRT and P GRT .
Comparing the profits under a CIT with the profits under a GRT for firms located
in each state leads to the proposition below.
Proposition 2 Switching to a GRT from a CIT, the home state shifts the profit
from the out-of-state upstream firm to in-state downstream firms if the revenue neutral
tGRT is sufficiently low.
Proof See Appendix A. 
The profit shifting result potentially comes from two sources, an increase in the
price of the final good and a decrease in the price of the intermediate good. However,
since a monopoly operates on the elastic part of the demand curve, the increase
in price will actually decrease the sales revenue. Therefore, the primary driver of
this profit shifting result is the fact that the out-of-state upstream firm lowers the
15

Under a single sales factor apportionment formula, the share of a corporation’s total profit that
a particular state would tax would be based solely on the share of the corporation’s nationwide sales
occurring in the state. Also, it is assumed that the manufacturer can be taxed by state 1 according
to the nexus requirement.
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input price it charges the in-state downstream firm. Consequently, the out-of-state
upstream firm’s profit decreases and it flows to the in-state downstream firm when
the home state replaces a CIT with a GRT.
The analysis above explores the possibility that the home state can change the
profit distribution across states by replacing the current CIT to a GRT. Specifically,
when the downstream firm is located in the home state, the home state replacing a
CIT with a GRT can bring in more profits.

1.5

Choice of Organizational Form

The discussions above focus on criticisms of GRTs and show that the relative
performance of GRTs is not necessarily that bad. One reason why states might
favor a GRT is broadening the tax base. Corporate income taxes apply only to
corporations earning positive profits, and pass-through entities are generally not
subject to CITs. Therefore, firms have the incentive to distort their organizational
forms to avoid income taxes under CITs. However, unlike CITs, GRTs typically
apply to almost all business entities, including C corporations, S corporations, limited
liability companies, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. One would expect that the
incentive to choose organizational form for tax purposes would be eliminated under
GRTs. In this section, the incentive to change organizational form and the associated
impacts on the price of the final good under a GRT versus a CIT are investigated.
As in the previous analysis, both states start with a single sales factor apportionment
CIT and then the home state switches to a GRT.
The assumption of zero marginal cost for the downstream firm is relaxed in
this extension of the basic model. The downstream retailer now incurs a marginal
cost of transferring the intermediate good into the final good. As discussed earlier,
under CITs, pass-through entities are not subject to taxes while C corporations are.
However, C corporations are able to have as many shareholders as possible, which

13

allows them to have easier access to capital at relatively lower prices.16 For the
purposes of the model, the increased access to capital markets manifests itself in
lower marginal costs for C corporations than for non-corporate firms. Further, the
downstream retailer is initially a non-taxable entity under the CIT, such as an S
corporation or LLC. As in the previous scenario, both states initially have a single
sales factor apportionment CIT.
For simplicity, assume the downstream retailer has a constant marginal cost. The
marginal cost is cL if the retailer is a C corporation, and cH if an S corporation,
where cL < cH .17

The retailer initially has a marginal cost of cH based on the

presumption that the benefit of reducing tax liability is greater than the cost saving of
incorporation. As in the previous case, the monopoly retailer buys products from the
manufacturer in state 2 and sells the final good in state 1 (home state). The market
demand for the final good is P = 1 − q. The wholesale price that the manufacturer
charges the retailer is WH .
With the same approach, solving both firms’ problems yields the solutions:WHCIT =
1
(1
2

+ cup − cH ) and P CIT = 14 (3 + cup + cH ).18 Hence, the retailer’s profit is

1
(1
16

−

CIT 2
).
cup − cH )2 = (qH

When the home state enacts a GRT to replace the CIT at a revenue-neutral
rate tGRT , the benefit from being a non-corporate entity to avoid income tax
disappears. All retailers are subject to the tax whether they are C corporations
or not. Furthermore, the tax applies to the gross receipts instead of the profit;
therefore, there are no deductions for costs. The solutions from both firms’ problems
GRT 2

up

) +c
are: WHGRT = 21 [ (1−t1−tGRT

− cH ] and P GRT = 41 [3 +

16

cup
(1−tGRT )2

+

cH
1−tGRT

].19

The

Both C corporations and S corporations have capital market access; however, an S corporation
may have no more than 100 shareholders and only one class of common stock, and in exchange,
it delivers its owners from all corporate-level taxation. The steady rise in the importance of S
corporations indicates that the choice of organizational form is responsive to taxation, at least
among smaller companies (Auerbach, 2006).
17
The use of the S corporation is just an example of non-taxable entities. In reality, some states
may tax S corporations. To the extent that more restrictions may apply to S corporations than
partnerships, or sole proprietorships, the latter entities might be better examples in some cases.
18 CIT
qH = 14 (1 − cup − cH ).
up
19
GRT
Correspondingly, qH
= 14 [1 − (1−tcGRT )2 − 1−tcH
GRT ].
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CIT 2
non-corporate retailer’s after-tax profit under a CIT equals (qH
) (not subject
GRT 2 20
to tax), while its after-tax profit under a GRT equals (1 − tGRT )(qH
).
It is
GRT
CIT
straightforward to show that qH
< qH
, and given 1 − tGRT < 1 for any positive

tax rate, the non-corporate retailer’s net profit decreases under a GRT compared with
the situation under a CIT. An interesting question would be whether there exists an
incentive for the non-corporate retailer to become a C-corporate retailer under a GRT.
If so, how would it affect the consumers and producers?
Proposition 3 If the home state switches to a GRT from a CIT, there is an
incentive for the non-corporate retailer to become a C corporation. Furthermore, the
price of the final good under a GRT is lower than the price under a CIT as long as
cH − cL >

tGRT
1−tGRT

[cL +

cup (2−tGRT )
].
1−tGRT

Proof Given that a C corporation has a non-tax benefit (lower marginal cost)
and there is no cost deduction under a GRT, intuitively, the S-corporate retailer has
an incentive to switch back to a C corporation. If the S-corporate retailer becomes
a C corporation, it would lower the marginal cost to cL . Solving the maximization
problems for both upstream and downstream firms yields the retailer’s after-tax profit
after switching, (1 − tGRT )q 2 where q = 14 [1 −

cup
(1−tGRT )2

−

cL
1−tGRT

]. Given cL < cH ,

GRT 2
GRT
) ; thus, the non. This implies (1 − tGRT )q 2 > (1 − tGRT )(qH
then q > qH

corporate retailer would have the incentive to become a C corporation under the
GRT. In this case, the price of the final good when the S-corporate retailer becomes
GRT
a C corporation is Pswitch
= 14 [3 +

cup
(1−tGRT )2

+

cL
1−tGRT

].

An interesting result is the price effect after correcting the distortion on
organizational form. To see why the price of the final good could be even lower
under a GRT, I compare the price after a switch under the GRT with the price under
1 [(1−t
The retailer’s after-tax profit under a GRT= 16
GRT
See footnote 19 for the expression for qH
.
20

15

GRT 2

) −cup −(1−tGRT )cH ]2
(1−tGRT )3

GRT 2
=(1 − tGRT )(qH
) .

up

GRT
a CIT. That is, Pswitch
− P CIT = 14 [ (1−tcGRT )2 +

GRT

cL t
GRT
Pswitch
− P CIT = 41 [ 1−t
GRT +

cL
1−tGRT

− cup − cH ]. Rearrange to get

cup (1−(1−tGRT )2 )
(1−tGRT )2

− (cH − cL )].

Notice that this expression is monotonically decreasing in the difference between cH
and cL . When tGRT = 0,
1
GRT
Pswitch
− P CIT = (cL − cH ) < 0.
4
Therefore, for certain values of cup , cL and cH such that cH − cL >

tGRT
1−tGRT

[cL +

cup (2−tGRT )
],
1−tGRT

GRT
Pswitch
is less than P CIT . This implies an increase in consumer surplus under the GRT.

The result contradicts the conventional wisdom that GRTs always lead to a higher
price of the final good. 
The analysis above ignores personal income taxes and it is more consistent with
situations for relatively large companies since personal income taxes are less of a
concern for them. One can think of it as an extreme case where corporate profits
are distributed to shareholders as dividends and assume they are taxed at the same
tax rates as normal earnings.21 Nevertheless, the analysis might not fit well for small
business. For most small businesses, personal income taxation will be an important
factor when deciding the organizational form. To account for small businesses, the
following combines considerations of personal income taxes and corporate income
taxes at both state and federal levels to examine the organizational choices faced by
small businesses. Let tfc , tsc denote the federal and state corporate income tax rates,
respectively; tfp , tsp denote the federal and state personal income tax rates. In addition,
the analysis considers two cases in which the profit is retained by a C-corporate retailer
in the first case and distributed to its shareholders in the second.22
Case 1: Profit is retained by a C-corporate retailer.
21

In reality, dividends are taxed at a lower rate; however, the assumption of same rates would not
change the nature of the problem although thresholds for the conditions will change.
22
For corporations, profits can be retained; therefore, in the short run, personal income taxes
won’t be an issue in the first case.
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With a CIT, a C-corporate retailer solves the following problem:

M ax (1 − tfc )(1 − tsc )[(1 − qL )qL − (WL + cL )qL ].
qL

(1.3)

A non-corporate retailer solves the following problem:

M ax (1 − tfp )(1 − tsp )[(1 − qH )qH − (WH + cH )qH ].
qH

(1.4)

Results from retailer’s problems would remain the same as those from profit
maximization under a CIT. The downstream retailer would choose to be a noncorporate entity as long as the combined personal income tax rate (tfp + tsp − tfp tsp )
is less than the combined corporate income tax rate (tfc + tsc − tfc tsc ), and the non-tax
benefit of incorporation (a lower marginal cost) is not sufficient to compensate the
tax disadvantage of incorporation.
When the home state replaces a CIT with a GRT, retailers of both types have to
pay a GRT. In addition, a C-corporate retailer still has to pay a federal CIT. Hereafter,
the following notation will be used to simplify the expression: Ri = (1 − qi )qi and
Ci = (Wi + ci )qi .
A C-corp retailer’s problem is as follows:

M ax (1 − tGRT )RL − CL − tfc (RL − CL ).
qL

(1.5)

A non-corp retailer solves the following:

M ax (1 − tGRT )RH − CH − (tfp + tsp −tfp tsp )(RH − CH ).
qH

(1.6)

With a GRT, the non-corporate retailer would have the incentive to become
a corporation if tfc < tfp + tsp − tfp tsp . In addition, incorporation brings down the
marginal cost from cH to cL ; therefore, the tax rate differential does not need to
be extremely high to support the incentive to incorporate under a GRT. Without
solving the problems, it is easy to find that the first order conditions for optimization
17

problems above indicate the demand for the input decreases and it becomes flatter.
The intuition is that a GRT lowers the effective marginal revenue for retailers, which
makes the demand for the input more elastic; thus, the upstream firm is forced to
charge a lower price to induce retailers to buy more than they would otherwise.
Profits would be shifted from the upstream firm to the downstream firm as long as
the GRT tax rate is sufficiently low. Propositions 2 and 3 would still hold, however,
the threshold to support it would differ from the previous case.
Case 2: Profit is distributed to shareholders by a C-corporate retailer.
In this case, personal income taxes are considered by retailers of both types.
With a CIT, a C-corporate retailer solves the following:

M ax [(1 − tfc )(1 − tsc ) − tfp − tsp + tfp tsp ](RL − CL ).
qL

(1.7)

While a non-corporate retailer solves the same problem as in (1.4).
From the objective functions above, it is apparent that a CIT would cause double
taxation. For small businesses, pass-through entities would be preferred if the tax
disadvantage of incorporation is greater than the non-tax benefit (lower marginal
cost).
With a GRT, a C-corporate retailer’s objective function becomes:

M ax (1 − tGRT )RL − CL − (tfc + tfp + tsp − tfp tsp )(RL − CL ).
qL

(1.8)

While a non-corporate retailer’s objective function remains the same as in (1.6).
Comparing the objective functions above, one can see that a state GRT reduces
the tax incentive to distort the organizational form since both retailers are subject to
the same state GRT. The federal corporate income tax still drives a difference in tax
treatments between two types of entities. However, given that incorporation enables
firms to enjoy lower marginal costs, which results in greater quantity produced, the
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profit increases if the non-corporate retailer becomes a corporation.23 If the nontax benefits exceed the tax disadvantage of incorporation, non-corporate retailer
would like to become a corporation. In general, small business firms would face
the similar tradeoff between non-tax benefits of incorporation and tax disadvantages
of incorporation that relatively large firms would face, and the analysis above would
still be valid although the conditions would change accordingly.
In summary, this section looks at a situation where the home state enacts a GRT
to replace the original CIT and finds that by switching to a GRT from a CIT, the
home state can reduce the distortion on the choice of organizational form under a
CIT. Consequently, consumers might even benefit from a decrease in the price of the
final good.

1.6

Incentives to Invest in Cost-Saving Innovation

Unlike CITs, standard GRTs impose taxes on the gross receipts; therefore, there is
no deduction for costs under GRTs. From the perspective of tax administration,
state governments would favor the significant reduction in the administration cost.
However, tax economists argue that no deduction for costs places a heavy burden on
firms with lower margins (Mikesell, 2007a; McLure, 2005). Reducing costs would be
very important for these firms. In addition, from a firm’s perspective, a dollar saved
in cost under a GRT is a dollar gained while a dollar saved under a CIT partly goes
to the tax revenue. It would be interesting to examine whether GRTs create a greater
incentive for cost-saving innovation than CITs.
Reconsider the baseline model where the upstream monopoly firm produces an
intermediate good and sells to a downstream monopoly firm. All assumptions remain
the same except that the upstream firm can now invest in R&D to reduce its marginal
cost to c(R), where R is the money spent on the innovation process, c(0) = cup ,
0

00

c (R) < 0 and c (R) > 0. Assume the upstream firm makes the innovation investment
23

Earlier discussion shows that profits for retailers are monotonically increasing in quantity.
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choice before determining the price of the intermediate good.24 The focus now is on
the incentive to invest in cost-saving technology; therefore, I examine the case where
the downstream firm will buy the good from the upstream firm under both tax systems
and analyze the differential incentives to invest in R&D.
With a CIT at a rate t, the downstream firm solves the same problem as in (1.1).
The solution for the problem is q CIT =

1−W
.
2

The upstream firm maximizes the profit

given R determined in the innovation stage. The problem is very similar to (1.2),
except replacing cup with c(R). Back to the innovation stage, the upstream firm
chooses R to maximize its net profit:

M ax (1 − t)[(W CIT − c(R))q CIT − R].
R

(1.9)

where W CIT is the solution from the input price setting stage.
Manipulating the first order condition yields the following:

[c(RCIT ) − 1]

c0 (RCIT )
= 1.
4

(1.10)

where RCIT is the level of investment that the upstream firm chooses under a CIT.
With a GRT at the same rate, the last two stages’ problems are essentially the
same as previously discussed GRT cases, given R. The upstream firm determines R
by solving M ax [(1 − t)W GRT − c(R)]q GRT − R. The level of the investment under a
R

GRT is implicitly determined by the following equation:

[c(RGRT ) − (1 − t)2 ]

c0 (RGRT )
= 1.
4(1 − t)2

(1.11)

Proposition 4 GRTs create less incentive for cost-saving innovation than CITs
do.
24

In most cases, firms make innovation decisions ahead of time because it may take a relatively
long time to improve the technology.
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Proof Comparing equation (1.10) and (1.11), it is easy to see that they are the
same when t = 0. The left-hand sides of both equations are the marginal benefits of
innovation under each tax regime. Let M B CIT and M B GRT denote the left hand sides
of equation (1.10) and (1.11), respectively. Comparing the two marginal benefits of
innovation investment when holding the investment level R the same in both cases
yields:
0

0

0

c (R)
c (R)
M B CIT − M B GRT = c(R) c (R)
− c(R) 4(1−t)
2 = c(R) 4 [1 −
4

1
].
(1−t)2

0

Given that c (R) < 0 and t > 0, M B CIT − M B GRT > 0. The marginal benefit of
innovation is higher under a CIT than under a GRT, which implies that firms will
have greater incentive to invest in cost-saving innovation under a CIT.25 
The intuition behind this result is that a GRT reduces firms’ effective marginal
benefit of innovation while a CIT reduces the gross marginal benefit and marginal
cost at the same time, leaving the effective marginal benefit unchanged. To sum up, a
GRT does not lead to a greater incentive for firms to invest in cost-saving innovation
compared with the situation under a CIT.
Although not presented here, differential incentives to innovate for the downstream
firm can also be investigated. In this case, the downstream firm incurs a marginal
cost of processing the intermediate good into the final good, which can be reduced by
innovation investment. The timing is still that the innovation decision is made before
firms making price decisions. Similar to the above analysis, comparing the marginal
benefits of innovation under both tax systems shows that there is less incentive for
innovation under a GRT.

1.7

The Impact of Market Structure

The above analyses assume both upstream and downstream firms are monopolies.
However, the real world involves various market structures that may significantly
differ from each other. One may wonder whether the results still hold in other
25

The result is valid for any positive tax rate, including the revenue neutral tax rate.

21

market structures. Intuitively, market structures might influence previous results
in the following ways. First and foremost, markets can differ significantly in the
degrees of competition. In general, competition in the market impacts firms’ ability
to charge a higher price; therefore, the incentive underlying the vertical integration
and profit shifting results are potentially affected. Furthermore, various combinations
of upstream and downstream market structures result in different distributions of
market power between the upstream and the downstream firms. These potentially
influence how the input price is set.
To examine the impact of market structure on previous results, the downstream
market is altered to increase the degree of competition in the market. Suppose there
are n downstream firms competing on quantity. The upstream firm is a monopoly.
Using backward induction, the downstream firms play a standard Cournot game,
each taking other firms’ quantity and the input price as given. Assume a symmetric
equilibrium exists, summing up the Cournot equilibrium quantities of all downstream
firms gives the market demand for the input. Substituting the market demand
into the upstream firm’s problem under each tax system yields the solutions under
each tax regime:W CIT =
2+n
2(n+1)

1+cup
,
2

P CIT =

2+n(1+cup )
;W GRT
2(n+1)

=

1−t
2

+

cup
,P GRT
2(1−t)

=

up

nc
26
+ 2(1−t)
The solutions indicate that as the number of downstream firms
2 (n+1) .

increases, the price of the final goods (P ) decreases under both tax regimes with a
higher price under a GRT.27 This is consistent with the notion that competition drives
down the price. What is interesting is that the price of the input (W ) under each tax
regime does not change as the number of firms increases in the downstream market. A
careful look into the first order condition from a downstream firm’s problem reveals
that as the number of firms increases, the market demand for the input, deriving
from this first order condition, is simply a multiple of the demand in the baseline
model. Accordingly, the objective function for the upstream firm is also a multiple of
the one in the baseline model, which suggests the input price remain the same. The
26

Derivation of the solutions is shown in Appendix A.
c
1−t− 1−t
(1−c)
∂P GRT
−1
= − 2(1+n)
= n+1
· 2(1−t)(n+1)
< 0 given previous assumptions hold.
2 < 0,
∂n

27 ∂P CIT
∂n
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discussion above implies that Lemma 1 still holds, meaning the vertical integration
discussion is still valid. A further look at the difference in the profit per unit for
the downstream firm (P − W ) under both tax regimes would allow one to examine
the profit shifting possibility. As n increases, the difference between (P GRT − W GRT )
and (P CIT − W CIT ) increases, which implies that the profit per unit increases when
the home state enacts a GRT to replace the CIT in a more competitive downstream
market.28 However, the quantity difference (QGRT − QCIT < 0) decreases, indicating
that the reduction in quantity due to a switch to a GRT is greater as n increases.
Therefore, the profit shifting result holds only if the percentage increase in the profit
per unit is greater than the percentage decrease in the quantity.
The general finding from this exercise is that as the number of downstream firms
increases, the price difference in the intermediate good between two tax systems
increases. This suggests that the incentive for vertical integration argument becomes
stronger. In addition, the profit shifting result is still applicable as long as the per
unit profit increase is sufficient. Arguments on organizational form and the incentive
to innovate are less influenced by the degree of competition in the market since the
former relies on GRTs’ tax neutrality on organizational form and the cost benefit to
incorporation, while the latter comes from the fact that GRTs reduce the effective
marginal benefit of innovation compared to CITs. To sum up, previous analyses are
still applicable within confines of the models when the downstream market structure
changes.

1.8

Influence of Bargaining Power

In addition to impacts of varying market structures, the analysis above does not
allow the upstream and downstream firms to bargain with each other for the price
of the intermediate good. When the upstream monopolist posts a price, it offers a
take-it-or-leave-it opportunity to the downstream sellers. Therefore, previous analysis
28

See Appendix A for the proof.
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inherently assumes the upstream firm has all of the bargaining power. Despite this
a GRT still leads to a lower price for the intermediate good compared to a CIT
case. It would be interesting to see what happens as the downstream firm gains more
bargaining power. Would the reduction in the price of the intermediate good after
home state’s switching to a GRT be greater when the downstream firm has all of the
bargaining power? In this section, the upstream and downstream firms play a slightly
different game, which allows an examination of the influence of bargaining power on
firms’ behavior. In particular, it explores how different distributions of bargaining
power among the upstream and downstream firms impact the results.
Suppose the upstream and downstream firms play a Nash bargaining game at
the beginning. They bargain over the price that the upstream firm charges the
downstream firm. Then the downstream firm decides how much to produce, and
thus, the price of the final good. Let b (b ≤ 1) indicate the bargaining power for
the upstream firm and 1 − b for the downstream firm. The market structure and the
associated cost structure are the same as in the baseline model .
With a CIT, the downstream firm maximizes the profit given the bargained price
of the intermediate good. The problem looks exactly like (1.1) in Section 2. What
differs is the first-stage game that the two firms can bargain over W . The Nash
bargaining game is the following:

M ax (1 − t)[(W − cup )q CIT ]b [(1 − q CIT )q CIT − W q CIT ]1−b .
W

(1.12)

Solving the game yields W CIT = 21 (b − bcup + 2cup ). Consequently, the price of the
final good is P CIT = 41 (2 + b − bcup + 2cup ).
With a GRT, the downstream firm maximizes the after-tax profit, which yields
q GRT as in Section 3. Back to the bargaining stage, firms maximize the product of
after-tax profits for both firms:
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M ax [(1 − tGRT )W q GRT − cup q GRT ]b [(1 − tGRT )(1 − q GRT )q GRT − W q GRT ]1−b .
W

(1.13)
The solution is W GRT =
sets the price, P GRT =

b(1−tGRT )2 −bcup +2cup

. Accordingly, the downstream firm

2(1−tGRT )
2(1−tGRT )2 +b(1−tGRT )2 −bcup +2cup
.
4(1−tGRT )2

Proposition 5 More bargaining power in the upstream firm leads to a greater
reduction in the price of the intermediate good when replacing the CIT with a GRT.
However, if the bargaining power is completely shifted to the downstream firm, the
price of the intermediate good is higher under a GRT.
Proof Comparing the results under both tax systems yields the following:
∂(W CIT −W GRT )
∂b

=

1 GRT
[t
2

− cup +

cup
1−tGRT

] =

1 GRT
[t
2

+ cup ( 1−t1GRT − 1)] > 0. This

means that the more bargaining power the upstream firm has, the more reduction
in the price of the intermediate good when the home state replaces the CIT with
a GRT.29 When b = 1, the upstream firm having all of the bargaining power, the
objective functions under both tax systems are the same as those in Section 2 and
3; thus, the results coincide. When b = 0, W CIT = c < W GRT =

c
(1−tGRT )

for any

positive tax rate: this implies that if the downstream firm has all of the bargaining
power, different from the previous finding, the price of the intermediate good is now
higher under a GRT. The intuition here is that the upstream firm is forced to charge
the lowest price since it has no say in the game, that is, it charges the marginal cost
of production. Furthermore, a GRT drives up the effective marginal cost while a CIT
does not due to cost deduction; therefore, the price of the intermediate good is higher
under a GRT than under a CIT. Consequently, previous profit shifting and vertical
integration arguments disappear in this extreme case. 
A careful look into the distribution of bargaining power also provides some insights
about the relative competition in the upstream and downstream market. One can
29

As long as tGRT < 1 −

cup (2 − b)
, W CIT > W GRT .
b
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make the connection that more bargaining power in the downstream firms corresponds
to a relatively more competitive upstream market. The intuition is that a more
competitive upstream market indicates that the downstream firms have more choices
when making their input decisions; thus, less bargaining power for any upstream
firm. Similarly, more bargaining power in the upstream firm reflects relatively more
competition in the downstream market. The discussion just offers an alternative way
to look at the effect of varying both market structures. Specifically, as b increases,
more bargaining power in the upstream firm can be considered analogous to relatively
more competition in the downstream market. As discussed in the previous section,
it would result in a greater reduction in the price of the intermediate good. This
suggests that if the quantity decrease is not significant, the profit flows more to
the downstream when the state where the downstream is located replaces a CIT
with a GRT. On the other hand, the upstream becomes more competitive and the
downstream becomes relatively less competitive as b decreases, and the gain from
the reduction in the intermediate good price would be smaller when the home state
enacts a GRT to replace the CIT. The incentives for vertical integration and profit
shifting arguments become weaker and the domain for the support shrinks.

1.9

Conclusion

Understanding the incentives and impacts of GRTs is an important task for tax
economists and policy makers. The conventional wisdom is overwhelmed by the
notion that GRTs are really poor tax instruments. However, since we are not living in
the first-best world, the appropriate analysis should examine the relative advantages
and disadvantages of GRTs over feasible alternatives. The comparative performance
of GRTs may not be as bad as the perception of their absolute performance.
This paper uses a basic model with different extensions to explore the various
incentives and effects of GRTs versus CITs. The model is exploited to investigate the
incentive for vertical integration in the sense of make-or-buy decisions, the effect on
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the profit distribution between the out-of-state firm and in-state downstream firms,
the incentive to change organizational form for tax purposes, and the incentive for
cost-saving innovation.
I find several interesting results. First, if firms prefer making their own inputs to
buying from the upstream firm under a GRT, they would also do so under a CIT.
However, there exist situations in which firms would prefer buying the inputs under
a GRT but making their own inputs under a CIT depending on the relative cost
of buying versus making under different scenarios. This overturns the conventional
wisdom, with GRTs providing less incentives for vertical integration. Second, the
home state can shift profits from upstream, out-of-state firms to downstream, in-state
firms by replacing a CIT with a GRT. Third, a GRT helps eliminate the incentive to
change organizational forms for tax purposes, and consequently it can result in even
lower prices of the final goods. Finally, a GRT creates less incentive for cost-saving
innovation than a CIT does.
This paper is the first to provide a careful theoretical analysis investigating the
impacts of GRTs in an equilibrium framework. It seeks to use simple models that
can exemplify the nature of the problem, followed by robustness checks to verify the
validity of the results. But the real world is more complicated than the constructed
models. In addition to those discussed in the paper, there are several other aspects
worth further examination. First of all, it would be interesting to incorporate tax
planning of multistate companies into the model and see how the nature of the
problem evolves. Moreover, this analysis could be extended to look at a new dimension
of state tax competition, that is, states compete with each other by replacing the
old tax instrument with a new one. Of course, this would complicate the models
and they may not be solvable. Furthermore, it would be useful to perform welfare
analysis under the two systems. Last but not least, it is very important to find
empirical evidence to support the predicted results from the models. With more
states considering some form of GRTs, it would be worthwhile to collect the data
and test the theoretical predictions. To conclude, perceptions about GRTs are not
27

necessarily true and further research on the effects of GRTs is necessary to help
understand these taxes before making any policy suggestion.
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Chapter 2
Reconsidering Gross Receipts
Taxes: An Empirical Study
2.1

Introduction

With the continuing decline in corporate income tax revenue and the distortions
on investment and location choices associated with corporate income taxes (CITs),
states have been actively looking for alternative ways to tax businesses.30 Despite
heavy criticism, a significant and perhaps surprising movement since 2002 has been
the resurgence of gross receipts taxes (GRTs).31 Five states, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Texas, levied certain forms of GRT by 2008, and five other states,
California, Illinois, Maine, Montana, and Rhode Island, have considered modified
GRTs.32 In 2010, Oklahoma levied a variant of GRT. As more states enact GRTs
or some variants of GRTs, it is important to find evidence of the effects of GRTs on
30

The revenue from the federal CIT dropped from between 5 and 6 percent of GDP in the
early 1950s to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2008. See details at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefingbook/background/numbers/revenue.cfm.
31
States have also considered net receipts taxes. The California Commission on the 21st Century
Economy recently proposed a Business Net Receipts Tax. In general, GRTs do not allow deductions
for input costs, but net receipts taxes allow deduction for non-labor inputs.
32
Kentucky and New Jersey used gross receipts as an alternative minimum in their corporate
income tax structure.
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the economy. Nevertheless, the effects of imposing GRTs as replacements for existing
taxes have never been examined empirically.
There is little empirical literature on GRTs, although GRTs have been heavily
criticized in the past. The main criticism comes from the fact that a GRT taxes gross
revenues at each stage of the production process, creating multiple layers of taxation
along the supply chain, a phenomenon called tax pyramiding. Because of this tax
pyramiding, conventional wisdom claims that GRTs create an incentive for firms to
vertically integrate to reduce tax liabilities. However, the previous essay argues that
the reverse could be true with less vertical integration under a GRT but more vertical
integration under a CIT. Several results from the theoretical analysis raise caution
about the traditional views on the effects of GRTs.
States may impose GRTs for different reasons, either politically or economically.
One general argument supporting GRTs is that they broaden the tax base; thus,
allowing for reductions in the tax rate.
positive profits.33

A CIT only taxes corporations with

According to 2007 Integrated Business Data, corporations on

average account for 19.7% of total businesses.34 The GRT base is much broader
because it taxes all businesses, allowing for a lower tax rate.35 Another argument
is that GRTs eliminate the incentive to distort the choice of organizational form
(Goolsbee, 2004; Luna and Murray, 2010). Unlike a CIT, a GRT generally applies
to all business entities, including C corporations, S corporations, limited liability
companies, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. Therefore, the tax incentive to be
a non-corporate enterprise that arises under a CIT disappears. In general, GRTs can
reduce tax planning related to business structures, definitions of profits, and situsing
of economic activity.
Focusing on the latter argument, this paper is the first to empirically test the effect
of GRTs on the distribution of firms by organizational form. Data from nonemployer
33

Some states tax limited liability companies.
For more details, see http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07ot3naics.xls.
35
GRTs also broaden the tax base by taxing gross revenues instead of profits; however, the effective
tax rate is not necessarily lower due to tax pyramiding.
34
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firms, accounting for more than 70% of total businesses, are used in the analysis.
Using two measures of the corporate share, the corporate share of total nonemployer
firms and of total nonemployer receipts, the results show that states with a GRT have
a higher share of corporate firms. This suggests that GRTs reduce the distortion on
the choice of organizational form and firms are more willing to be C corporations
to enjoy the non-tax benefits of incorporation. Furthermore, the results using the
corporate share of total receipts indicate that the share of real activity of corporations
increases after replacing a CIT with a GRT, which may imply that CITs induce a
significant reduction in the real activity of C corporations in terms of sales. By
replacing the CIT with a GRT, states may promote the real activity done by C
corporation.36
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
background on the choice of organizational form under a CIT. Section 3 reviews the
literature on the choice of organizational form. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
background and identifies the testable hypotheses based on the theory. Section 5
develops the empirical model followed by data description in Section 6. Section 7
discusses the results. Section 8 offers a brief conclusion with a discussion of limitations
and possible future research.

2.2

Institutional Background

Firms may choose between corporate and non-corporate structure based on tax and
non-tax factors. On the tax side, income earned by firms is taxed under the corporate
income tax and again under the personal income tax when the profit is distributed to
the shareholders, leading to double taxation. If instead the firm chooses to be a noncorporate entity, such as an S corporation or other pass-through entity, the income
is only subject to the personal income tax for each owner of the firm. Earnings from
pass-through entities flow to their owners and are taxed only once on the owners’
36

The analysis does not suggest that the total activity necessarily rises.
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personal income tax returns; thereby avoiding double taxation. A corporate firm,
however, can choose to retain profits within the firm. Retaining earnings is a way to
shift income from personal tax base to corporate tax base.37 Considering a closelyheld corporation, it is fairly easy to retain profits within the firm. This implies more
corporate taxable income and less personal taxable income, although it might incur
larger realized capital gains when and if the firm is sold. Upon sale of the firm, the
gains are taxed at a lower capital gains rate. Consequently, the incentive to choose
one form of organization versus the other depends partially on the differential tax
rate between corporate and personal income taxes.38
When personal income tax rates drop relative to corporate tax rates, it becomes
more attractive for any firm with positive income to shift from corporate to noncorporate status.39

The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which significantly decreased

personal income tax rates, provides a natural experiment for examination of this
argument.

MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) show that non-corporate activity

significantly increased following the tax reform. In general, the incentives for firms to
choose a specific organizational form depend on the particular tax rates faced by the
owners of each firm. For example, some firm owners may have marginal personal tax
rates that are higher than the corporate rate, while others will have lower personal tax
rates. Firms with positive profits would benefit from choosing a non-corporate form
when they are owned by individuals facing personal rates below the corporate rate.
When the relative taxation of corporate income rises, shifting to the non-corporate
sector should be concentrated among firms with positive taxable income.
37

See detailed discussions in Section 5 of Essay 1.
As Goolsbee (2004) shows, a simple model can be used to illustrate a firm’s decision about
whether to incorporate. Denote the revenue generated by a firm as R and non-tax benefits of
incorporation as B which depends on firm characteristics, x. Let tfnc , tsnc be the federal and state
personal income tax rates facing non-corporate firms, respectively; tfc , tsc be the federal and state
corporate income tax rates; te be the tax rate on equity income. A noncorporate firm gets no B but
pays only personal income taxes on the income and assume a firm of either type is capable of raising
˜)
the same revenue. A firm would prefer the noncorporate form when B(x) < R(t˜c − (1 − t˜c )te − tnc
f
f s
s
˜
where ti = ti + ti − ti ti , i = {c, nc}.
39
Owners of corporations can also shift profits through wage payouts to themselves to shift income
between the corporate and personal tax base.
38
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Corporations offer two major non-tax benefits.

First, it is much easier for

incorporated businesses to raise capital compared to businesses with other legal
structures, mainly because they can raise money by selling shares to shareholders.40
Issuance of equity dilutes ownership but share capital does not have to be paid back,
nor does it incur interest. For many small business owners, this is a great benefit
to business incorporation. Second, corporations have limited liability. Flow-through
entities generally do not have limited liability except for limited liability companies
(LLCs) and limited liability partnerships (LLPs).

This feature of incorporation

significantly reduces the risk involved with running a business, though other firms
could purchase insurance against such risk.

In addition, the risk involved with

becoming an entrepreneur falls on the shareholders, but they only carry the amount
equal to the percentage they have invested.41 Sole proprietorships and partnerships
are personally responsible for any downfalls the business may take. In general, easy
access to capital market and limited liabilities are the two major non-tax factors
influencing a firm’s incorporation choice (Goolsbee, 2004).

2.3

Literature on the Choice of Organizational
Form

Although there is little literature on the effects of GRTs on organizational form
choice, there is much richer literature on the choice of organizational form under
CITs. As discussed above, a CIT generates a distortion by taxing corporate income
at a differential rate compared with income earned in non-corporate form.

In

general, corporations pay tax on income earned at the corporate level and then
shareholders pay taxes either on capital gains or dividends. In fact, the taxation
40

During a recent hearing held by the Senate Finance Committee on March 8, 2011, Michael
Graetz of the Columbia Law School argued that under the current rules it would be foolish for
a large firm that can raise capital privately to organize as a corporation, which in turn implies
corporations have easier access to capital market.
41
Personal property could be taken to pay off business debts with an incorporated business if the
shareholder used his own assets as a guarantee against the businesses’ debts.
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of corporate income generally exceeds that of personal income.

This raises the

question of how distortionary the CIT is in practice. The conventional assumption
embedded in standard work by Harberger (1966) and Shoven (1976) is that non-tax
factors dominate in the decision on organizational form, so that certain industries
are necessarily corporate and others non-corporate. They use general equilibrium
models, and the results tend to suggest relatively small efficiency costs from corporate
taxation because activity does not easily shift between sectors. Later studies relax
this assumption and investigate firms’ choice of organizational form in response to
tax incentives. This would indicate larger efficiency costs under CITs.
Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1988, 1989, 1993) argue that CITs can lead to large
amounts of shifting between corporate and non-corporate status if firms of both types
produce in the same industry. Further, the deadweight loss (DWL) from the CIT is
very large. The DWL in their models is driven by how much firms in the same industry
shift to non-corporate forms due to the CIT. Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990, 1994,
1997) focus on the extent to which an increase in the CIT rate induces firms to shift
out of corporate form as an important way to examine the distortion created by the
CIT. They show that noncorporate activity tends to be concentrated in industries
where non-tax costs are small, leading to little excess burden from the tax distortion
on organizational form. Luna and Murray (2010) show that the large variation in
corporation versus partnership filings across the states can be partially attributed to
state tax policy. These studies differ in data and model specifications. However, the
earlier empirical work has generally found no evidence that real economic activity
shifts out of corporate form in response to tax changes except in special cases.
Goolsbee (2004) uses new data compiled in the Census of Retail Trade to
investigate the problem. His results based on cross-sectional data suggest that the
share of real economic activity performed by corporations responds to changes in the
relative taxation of corporate to personal income. Further, the response is many times
larger than that found in previous literature based on time-series data. However, the
results show little impact on the actual operations of firms in terms of labor intensity,
34

wages and the like. In addition, the results indicate that firms may exploit the
progressivity of the CIT system by breaking into numerous small firms as a means of
avoiding moving into higher income brackets.
To sum up, previous studies find that CITs’ differential tax treatments on corporate and non-corporate income distort firms’ organizational form choice; however, less
evidence is found on distortions in real economic activity. The GRT is imposed on
all businesses regardless of whether firms are corporate or non-corporate. Therefore,
GRTs would not be expected to distort organizational form choice. This paper adds
to the current literature by showing that replacing the CIT with a GRT may correct
the distortion on the choice of organizational form. In addition, it also provides
evidence that imposing a broad-based tax could increase the real economic activity
of corporations, which may suggest that a CIT causes losses in real economic activity
due to the distortion.

2.4

Theoretical Background

As discussed above, a firm can be organized as a non-corporate entity to avoid double
taxation and differential taxes on types of income under a CIT, but at the expense of
non-tax benefits of incorporation. In Essay 1, I show that if the home state replaces
the CIT with a GRT, there is an incentive for the non-corporate retailer to become
a C corporation (Proposition 3). The main reason for this result is that a GRT
eliminates the incentive to distort the organizational form choice and firms then prefer
the corporate form to enjoy the corresponding non-tax benefit. The non-tax benefit of
incorporation manifests itself in lower marginal costs in my model due to the increased
access to capital markets for corporations.
In the model for small businesses from the previous essay, all that matters are
the relative taxation of corporate versus personal income and the non-tax benefit of
incorporation. It does not emphasize the situations for firms operating in multiple
states.

For a multi-state firm, total profits from all businesses conducted are
35

apportioned to each corresponding state using an apportionment formula.

The

effective tax rate then becomes a weighted average of tax rates in all associated states
according to the apportionment formula. Since my sample data concentrate on small
entrepreneurial firms, this model is appropriate to capture the real concern. Given
that individual firm-level data are not available, it is impossible to directly investigate
individual firms’ organizational form choices. But from the model prediction that
firms are more willing to choose the corporate structure to enjoy the non-tax benefit
under a GRT than under a CIT, one can derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: States with GRTs have a higher corporate share of total firms.
Hypothesis 2: The corporate share increases as industry capital expenditures
rise.
The first hypothesis comes directly from the theoretical prediction. That is, firms
in GRT states are more likely to incorporate to enjoy the non-tax benefit; thus, a
greater corporate share in those states. The second hypothesis is associated with
the assumption that corporations benefit from easy access to capital; therefore, the
non-tax benefit of incorporation is greater for firms in industries with higher capital
expenditures. If this assumption is true, one would expect that the corporate share
should increase with industry capital expenditures.

2.5

Empirical Specification and Econometrics Issues

The following model is used to investigate the effects of state business taxes on the
corporate share in a given state and industry:
0

0

0

0

Cijt = α+βGit + ρKjt + σ T axit + θ Xijt + γ Zit + Yt + η INj · Kjt + υij + εijt .
The dependent variable Cijt is the corporate share of total firms for state i in
industry j at time t. The explanatory variables include major variables of interest,
Git and Kjt, where Git indicates whether state i at time t imposes a GRT or not; Kjt
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is the industry capital expenditure index, calculated by dividing the national capital
expenses in industry j by total national capital expenditures of all industries at time
t. The coefficients β and ρ correspond to the two hypotheses. Other explanatory
variables include: T axit , a vector of state tax structure variables; Xijt , a vector of
state–industry characteristics that may influence the gains to incorporation; Zit , a
vector of state-level characteristics that may influence the likelihood of incorporation;
νij , a vector of state–industry fixed effect dummies; Yt , a vector of year dummies which
control for common unobservable shocks across all states; INj , a vector of industry
dummies which only enter as interactions with the capital expenditure index; εijt , the
random error.42
There are two major econometric concerns for the model. First, the GRT dummy
might be endogenous. The concern is that states with fewer corporations might be
unable to generate sufficient CIT revenue; therefore, they are more likely to enact a
GRT as an alternative way to generate tax revenue. Two instruments are used to
perform the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity: the dollar amount of state
outstanding debts at the end of fiscal year, and a dummy variable indicating whether
the majority party in the Senate is Democratic. The test result fails to reject the
null hypothesis that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent
estimates.43 The reason may be that corporations have many ways to evade or avoid
corporate taxes and more corporations do not guarantee higher tax payments, which
means that the corporate share is not the major concern when states enact a GRT.
Second, the industry capital expenditure variable might be endogenous. Because
it is easier for corporations to get access to capital market, more corporations may
result in higher capital expenses. Therefore, the national industry capital expenditure
variable is instrumented with the number of firm establishments in the industry and
42

The industry dummies do not enter directly since they are already in the state-industry dummies
(linear combination). The purpose of adding the interactions is to see which industries have larger
increases in the corporate share when capital expenditures rise.
43
Regression results from the estimation using those two instruments are similar to the OLS
results.
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the average wage and salary in the industry at the national level. The test for
endogeneity of this variable rejects the null hypothesis; therefore, IV estimation is used
for the analysis and both instruments are highly significant in the first stage of the
IV estimation.44 Other general concerns regarding heteroscedasticity and correlations
are accounted for in the estimation.

2.6

45

Data

The best data source for the dependent variable is the legal form of organization data
from the Economic Census provided by the US Census Bureau. The Census Bureau
collected the data for all industries and states for 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007, but
the data are not open to the public and require special tabulations at the state level.
Goolsbee (2004) used the 1992 data for the retail trade industry as the source for
state data on organizational form. He explored the variation across industries (at
the three-digit SIC code level) and across states, but the data for the later years are
not available at this time. Instead, a dataset from Nonemployer Statistics is used.
Nonemployer Statistics is an annual series of information about businesses without
paid employees. According to the US Census Bureau, nonemployer firms account
for more than 70 percent of all businesses in the US. Nonemployers account for a
large part of the business universe in terms of the number of firms, although they
contribute a relatively small portion of the overall sales and receipts. This dataset has
its limitations; however, it is the only state-industry panel dataset available. There is
a fair amount of variation across industries and states in terms of distribution of firms
by organizational form. More importantly, multistate companies are less of a concern
in this dataset, which makes it easier to test the theoretical prediction.46 In general,
44

Tests of exogeneity for the other control variables are performed and reveal no significant
evidence of endogeneity.
45
Cluster-robust standard errors are used to control for heteroscadesticity and correlations in the
errors as suggested by Wooldridge (2002).
46
Multistate firms often have subsidiaries operating as non-corporate entities in different states
and establish headquarters as corporations sitused in states with no CITs. The choices for them are
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if GRTs affect incorporation decision for nonemployers, one would also expect to see
similar results with employers.
The panel dataset includes 48 continental states across 18 industries from 2002
to 2008. A glimpse at the summary statistics of this nonemployer dataset in Table
2.1 suggests that industries with higher capital expenditures tend to have a greater
share of corporations, measured by both percentage of total nonemployer firms and
percentage of total nonemployer firm receipts. This seems to be consistent with the
setup in my theoretical model that corporate firms can benefit from lower marginal
costs due to easy access to capital.
Further, a simple plot of the corporate shares in GRT states and non-GRT states
suggests that GRT states tend to have a higher share of corporations. Figure 2.1
shows both the corporate share of total firms and of total receipts.47

Source: Nonemployer Statistics, US Census Bureau
Figure 2.1: Corporate Shares in GRT and Non-GRT States

not just whether to incorporate or not; therefore, it would be harder to test the theoretical prediction
using the sample including those multistate firms. For generality of the results, it would be nice to
have the full sample including both employers and nonemployers but multistate firms would be an
issue.
47
Figure 2.1 excludes the states that imposed GRTs recently.
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Table 2.1: Capital Expenditure across Industries and Share of Firms by Organizational Form
Capital
Industry

Expense($M)

Average
# of

% of Firms

% of Receipts

Corporation

Partnership

Soleproprietorship

Corporation

Partnership

Soleproprietorship

firms
Forestry, fishing and agriculture
2,372

4562

5.06

3.20

91.75

13.61

8.41

77.98

Mining

149,895

2048

14.68

12.26

73.06

22.95

22.76

54.30

service

40

Utilities

98,272

339

17.51

6.08

76.41

36.39

21.11

42.50

Construction

41,690

50230

5.29

2.93

91.78

14.28

9.42

76.29

Manufacturing

211,357

6331

12.01

5.20

82.78

28.28

12.30

59.42

Wholesale trade

32,941

7915

13.96

4.85

81.19

24.73

9.00

66.27

Retail trade

73,436

38992

5.42

3.26

91.32

16.03

8.68

75.29

Transportation and warehousing

79,580

19720

6.31

2.34

91.35

13.47

5.01

81.53

Information

103,424

5953

9.18

4.87

85.95

25.57

15.51

58.92

Finance and insurance

145,352

14995

7.66

11.38

80.96

11.84

15.47

72.69

Real estate and rental

96,045

45628

13.78

37.76

48.46

17.11

59.38

23.51

Professional, technical services

32,738

57933

6.15

2.60

91.25

15.27

9.25

75.48

Administrative and support

4,561

30750

2.99

1.40

95.62

15.55

7.04

77.41

Educational services

16,546

9261

1.89

0.88

97.23

11.89

5.11

83.00

Healthcare and social assistance

27,390

34194

2.34

0.90

96.76

12.22

9.08

78.70

Arts, entertainment

90,044

20272

3.62

2.05

94.32

14.93

8.72

76.35

Accommodation and food services

17,025

5744

9.46

6.52

84.02

30.31

23.16

46.53

Other services

28,309

58216
2.97
1.62
95.41
Source: Nonemployer Statistics, US Census Bureau

11.81

5.99

82.19

In addition, the data from states that enacted GRTs in recent years suggest a
systematic increase in the corporate share after the implementation of GRTs. For
example, as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the corporate share of total firms and
the corporate share of total receipts in Ohio Manufacturing and Mining industries
experienced a jump when Ohio enacted the GRT in 2005. Similar patterns were
found in other industries as well.

Source: Nonemployer Statistics, US Census Bureau
Figure 2.2: Corporate Share in Ohio Mining Industry

Source: Nonemployer Statistics, US Census Bureau
Figure 2.3: Corporate Share in Ohio Manufacturing Industry
The major explanatory variables for the analysis are the dummy variable
indicating whether states impose a GRT and the industry capital expenditure variable
41

measured by the industry share of total capital expenditures at the national level. The
data for these two variables come from the Commerce Clearing House (CCH) State
Tax Handbook and the US Census Bureau Annual Capital Expenditures Survey.
Tax structure variables include the top statutory corporate income tax rate and
the average marginal personal tax rates on wage income, dividends, and capital gains.
These variables are included to control for the relative taxation of corporate and
personal income. The average marginal personal income tax rates on factor income
combining federal and state taxes were computed by the NBER’s TAXSIM model.48
An additional tax consideration relates to the progressivity of state corporate income
tax systems. As Luna and Murray (2010) argue, a pass-through entity can lower
the tax burden by spreading them among all members with each member taxed at
member rates instead of having all income taxed at the entity-level corporate rate. For
this reason, progressive CITs may create higher incentives for firms to be organized
as pass-through entities.49 Thirteen states had progressive corporate rate structures
in 2008. To control for this potential influence, a dummy variable indicating whether
states have a progressive CIT is included.
In addition to considerations of tax structure, state-industry characteristics may
also influence the probability of incorporation. Along the same lines of consideration
in Goolsbee’s (2004) paper, characteristics such as firm size, pay, number of
establishments and the like, can affect the incorporation decision by altering the value
of limited liability or access to capital markets. Therefore, I include industry total
establishments, industry average annual wage and salary, and industry employment
in a given state. Further, industry dummies are interacted with the industry capital
expense variable to control for any industry level variation in non-tax reasons for
incorporation.
48

The rates characterize differences in the state laws across states and times, without
conflating changes in the distribution of income through time or differences across states. See
http://www.nber.org/˜taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/.
49
Goolsbee (2004) provides another argument that the progressive tax structure may induce
companies to divide into numerous small firms.
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Finally, there may be time-varying state characteristics that potentially influence
the probability of incorporation in all industries. For instance, the overall business
climate and education level of residents might attract more corporate firms to
locate within the states. The general argument is that state economic status and
demographics can influence the probability of incorporation; thus, I include state
GDP, state unemployment rate, state per capita income, and percentage of population
over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree.

2.7

Results

Using the nonemployer panel dataset, the results in Table 2.2 show that a GRT
positively affects the corporate share of total nonemployer firms in a given state and
industry.50 This is consistent with the prediction that a GRT eliminates the distortion
on the choice of organizational form arising under the CIT and firms are more willing
to incorporate based on the non-tax benefits of incorporation. When a state replaces
the CIT with a GRT, the corporate share of total firms in a given state and industry
increases by 0.29 percentage points.51 This means that the industry average corporate
share of total firms would increase by 3.7%.52
Several other variables are also found to affect the incorporation decision in a
given state and industry. As shown in Table 2.2, the size of the economy measured
by state GDP has a positive effect on the corporate share. Furthermore, states having
a greater share of population with higher education tend to have a higher corporate
share. This may evidence that states with a pool of high-skill workers provide a
greater incentive for corporations to locate there. Meanwhile, the results also suggest
50

New Mexico is treated as a non-GRT state in my sample because its tax works like a sales tax
except that the tax is a broad-based tax. Regressions including New Mexico in the GRT states
result in similar findings.
51
The dependent variable is measured in percentage points. In addition, control variables enter
the regression in linear form, except for a few in natural log form. The choice of the functional form
is based on the plots of the data and is also consistent with those used in the previous literature.
52
The industry average corporate share of total firms in my sample is 7.8%. Imposing a GRT
would raise the corporate share to 8.09%, which is 3.7% increase in the corporate share.

43

Table 2.2: Panel Regression Results on State-Industry Corporate Share by Firms
GRT
Top CIT rate
Marginal tax rate on wage income
Marginal tax rate on dividends
Marginal tax rate on capital gains
Progressivity of CIT
LN (GDP)
Unemployment rate
% of population at least Bachelor’s degree
LN (Per capita personal income)
LN (Industry wage and salary)
LN (Industry employment)
LN (Industry establishments)
Industry capital expense
Utilities industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Manufacturing industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Wholesale trade industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Information industry dummy*Industry capital expense
Real estate and rental industry*Industry capital expense
Constant
Observation
Adjusted R-squared

Corporate Share of Total Firms
0.291***
(0.098)
-0.052***
(0.02)
-0.248**
(0.11)
-0.088**
(0.042)
-0.023
(0.04)
0.210
(0.14)
2.149**
(1.05)
0.059
(0.04)
0.085***
(0.01)
0.071
(0.69)
1.015***
(0.36)
-1.015
(0.71)
0.150
(0.41)
0.416**
(0.17)
0.824***
(0.19)
0.731***
(0.19)
0.408**
(0.20)
0.459**
(0.22)
0.566***
(0.20)
11.624**
(4.57)
5920
0.736

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parentheses. The results are from the second
stage of the IV estimation. The model includes state-industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Industry dummies
are interacted with industry capital expense and only the significant interactions are shown above to save space.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table 2.3: Panel Regression Results on State-Industry Corporate Share by Receipts
GRT
Top CIT rate
Marginal tax rate on wage income
Marginal tax rate on dividends
Marginal tax rate on capital gains
Progressivity of CIT
LN (GDP)
Unemployment rate
% of population at least Bachelor’s degree
LN (Per capita personal income)
LN (Industry wage and salary)
LN (Industry employment)
LN (Industry establishments)
Industry capital expense
Utilities industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Manufacturing industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Wholesale trade industry dummy *Industry capital expense
Information industry dummy*Industry capital expense
Real estate and rental industry *Industry capital expense
Constant
Observation
Adjusted R-squared

Corporate Share of Total Receipts
0.311*
(0.18)
-0.067***
(0.02)
-0.441**
(0.22)
-0.185
(0.22)
-0.214
(0.21)
0.441
(0.41)
3.203**
(1.50)
0.056
(0.07)
0.103***
(0.03)
1.011
(0.91)
1.893***
(0.44)
-1.011
(0.91)
0.301*
(0.18)
0.415**
(0.17)
0.634***
(0.23)
0.530**
(0.24)
0.605***
(0.20)
0.434**
(0.21)
0.531***
(0.23)
22.056**
(9.86)
5920
0.710

Notes: Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors in parentheses. The results are from the second
stage of the IV estimation. The model includes state-industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Industry dummies
are interacted with industry capital expense and only the significant interactions are shown above to save space.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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that industries with higher salaries tend to have a greater corporate share. Consistent
with previous literature, the corporate tax rate negatively affects the incorporation
decision, pinpointing that increasing the corporate tax burden reduces the corporate
share. The magnitude of the responses to corporate tax increases is more than double
that in Goolsbee (2004). In addition, the higher the tax rate on dividends, the lower
the corporate share. Further, the corporate share decreases with the tax rates on wage
income.53 One might expect that higher tax rates on wage income would encourage
incorporation decision. However, given nonemployers may be both a wage income
earner and the owner of a corporation, tax increases on wage income could discourage
both activities if the activities are correlated. Moreover, the corporate share of total
firms increases as industry capital expenses rise. Finally, five interactions of industry
dummies with the capital expense variable show significantly positive impacts on the
corporate share. Those industries, for example manufacturing, experience a larger
increase in the corporate share than other industries as capital expenditures rise.
The results above evidence the impact of a GRT on the corporate share of total
firms, but they do not show how the real activity of those corporations are influenced
by a GRT. Therefore, the second measure of the corporate share, the percentage
share of total receipts by C corporations, is used to perform the analysis. The results
in Table 2.3 suggest that GRT states have a higher share of real economic activity
done by C corporations. The point estimate is similar in magnitude although the
significance decreases compared to the previous results. The corporate share of total
receipts increases with industry capital expenses confirming the previous finding.
Further, higher corporate income tax rates discourage the real activity of corporations.
The magnitude of the real response to corporate income tax increases is slightly
greater than that of the response in the share of businesses. For the other control
variables, the results generally mimic the previous ones.
53

Replacing the average marginal personal tax rates on the three types of income with the top
personal income tax rate results in an insignificant coefficient.
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2.8

Conclusion

As more states show renewed interest in GRTs, understanding the incentives and
impacts of GRTs becomes an important task for researchers and policy makers.
Unfortunately, how GRTs actually affect the economy is largely unknown. This
paper is the first empirical work on the influence of GRTs on organizational form
choice. Based on the theoretical prediction that a GRT eliminates the incentive
to distort organizational form choice arising under the CIT, I empirically test the
influence of a GRT on the distribution of corporations within a state and industry.
The results show that states with GRTs have a greater corporate share in a given
industry, implying that GRTs reduce the distortion on the organizational form choice
and firms are more willing to be C corporations. Furthermore, the results that GRTs
positively influence both the corporate share of total firms and total receipts may
suggest that CITs induce a significant reduction in the share of real activity done by
C corporations. Of course, the empirical test in this paper is not a direct test. But it
suggests that replacing CITs with broad-based taxes is a way to reduce the distortion
on organizational form choice due to the neutral treatment on forms of businesses.
This paper provides important evidence for states that are considering GRTs as
a replacement of CITs. In addition, it provides the first evidence on the effects
of broad-based taxes. However, the paper suffers from the following limitations.
Not many states levied a GRT or its variants in the window I examine, although
exploring the variation across industries allows better identification of the effect. In
addition, several states enacted GRTs in recent years; thus, the data do not allow me
to investigate the long run effect. A longer panel will help provide more information.
Further, the data for this analysis come from Nonemployer Statistics and the results
may not be generalizable to other businesses. As mentioned earlier, the legal form
of organization data for both employer and nonemployer firms at state and industry
level are not available at the present. Nevertheless, if the results are found in the
nonemployer data, one would expect to see similar results with employer data. It is
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very important to conduct further research to understand the full potential effects of
GRTs and to guide the policy debates on business taxes.

48

Bibliography

49

Bibliography
[1] Alm, James, Calvin Blackwell and Michael McKee, 2004. “Audit Selection and
Firm Compliance with a Broad–based Sales Tax.” National Tax Journal 57(2):
209-227.
[2] Auerbach, Alan J., 2006. “The Future of Capital Income Taxation.” The 2006
Institute for Fiscal Studies Annual Lecture.
[3] Chamberlain, Andrew and Patrick Fleenor, 2006. “Tax Pyramiding:

The

Economic Consequences of Gross Receipts Taxes.” Tax Foundation Special
Report No. 147.
[4] Goolsbee, Austan, 2004. “The Impact of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence
from State Organizational Form Data. ” Journal of Public Economics 88(11):
2283– 2299.
[5] Gordon, R. and J. Mackie-Mason, 1990. “Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on Corporate Financial Policy and Organizational Form.” In: Slemrod, J. (Ed.),
Do Taxes Matter. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass,pp. 91-131.
[6] Gordon, R. and J. Mackie-Mason, 1994. “Tax Distortions to the Choice of
Organizational Form.” Journal of Public Economics 55(2): 279– 306.
[7] Gravelle, J. and L. Kotlikoff, 1988. “Does the Harberger Model Greatly
Understate the Excess Burden of the Corporate Income Tax?” NBER Working
Paper # 2742.
50

[8] Gravelle, J. and L. Kotlikoff, 1989. “The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of
Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the Same
Good.” Journal of Political Economy 97(4): 749– 780.
[9] Gravelle, J. and L. Kotlikoff, 1993. “Corporate Tax Incidence and Inefficiency
When Corporate and Noncorporate Goods are Close Substitutes.” Economic
Inquiry 31(4): 501-516.
[10] Harberger, A., 1966. “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital.” In:
Krzyzaniak, M. (Ed.), Effects of the Corporation Income Tax, Wayne State
University Press, Detroit, pp. 107-117.
[11] Luna, LeAnn and Matthew N. Murray, 2010. “The Effects of State Tax Structure
on Business Organizational Form.” National Tax Journal 63(4): 995– 1022.
[12] MacKie-Mason, J. and Roger Gordon, 1997. “How Much Do Taxes Discourage
Incorporation.” Journal of Finance 52(2): 477-505.
[13] McLure, Charles E. Jr., 2005a. “How—and How Not—to Tax Business.” State
Tax Notes 36(1): 29 – 34.
[14] McLure, Charles E. Jr., 2005b. “Why Ohio Should Not Introduce a Gross
Receipts Tax—Testimony of the Proposed Commercial Activity Tax.” State Tax
Notes 36(3): 213-215.
[15] Mikesell, John L., 2007a. “Gross Receipts Taxes in State Government Finances:
A Review of Their History and Performance.” Tax Foundation Background Paper
No. 53.
[16] Mikesell, John L., 2007b. “State Gross Receipts Taxes and the Fundamental
Principles of Tax Policy.” State Tax Notes 43: 615-632.

51

[17] Oakland, William H., and William A. Testa., 1996. “State-local Business
Taxation and the Benefits Principle.” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic
Perspectives 20: 2-19.
[18] Pogue, Thomas F., 2007. “The Gross Receipts Tax: A New Approach to Business
Taxation?” National Tax Journal 60(4): 821-840.
[19] Shoven, J., 1976. “The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from
Capital.” Journal of Political Economy 84(6): 1261–1283.
[20] Testa, William A. and Richard H. Mattoon, 2007. “Is There a Role for Gross
Receipts Taxation?” National Tax Journal 60(4): 799-818.
[21] Tirole, Jean, 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press.
[22] Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data, The MIT Press.

52

Appendix

53

Appendix A
Appendix Proofs
A.1

Proof for Proposition 2 in Section 1.3

Let g be the profit function under a CIT and f be the profit function under a GRT.
In addition, let z denote 1 − tGRT .
The retailer’s before-tax profit under a CIT:
g(cup )=

1
(1
16

− cup )2

The retailer’s before-tax profit under a GRT:
f (z, cup ) =

1 (3z 2 +cup −2z 3 −2cup z)(z 2 −cup )
16
z4

When z = 1, f = g. Examining

∂f
∂z

and evaluate it at z = 1,

cup )2 < 0. Over the interval, z ∈ (0, 1],
interval [1 − ε, 1) where ε > 0 such that

∂f
∂z

∂f
∂z

∂f
∂z

|z=1 = − 81 (1 −

is C 1 smooth, hence, there exists an

< 0. Correspondingly, this means f > g

where z ∈ [1 − ε, 1). Therefore, the retailer’s before-tax profit under a GRT is higher
than that under a CIT when the revenue neutral tax rate is very low under a GRT.
This implies that the home state can use GRTs to shift profits to the retailer in its
own state if the profit function for the downstream retailer is decreasing in z.
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A.2

Proof for Varying Market Structure in Section
1.7

Vary the downstream market structure: n firms compete in the downstream market.
All assumptions are the same as in the baseline model except that there are n
downstream firms competing on quantity. Let q i denote downstream firm i’s quantity
and q−i denote the quantity produced by all other firms.
With a CIT, firm i solves the following problem:
M ax(1 − t)[(1 − qi − q−i − W )qi ].
qi

The solution gives the best response function for firm i. Assume symmetric
equilibrium exists, the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each firm is q CIT =

(1−W )
.
1+n

Then substituting the Cournot equilibrium quantity into the upstream firm’s
objective function yields:
)n
M ax(1 − t)[(W − cup ) (1−W
].
1+n
W

Comparing the objective function for the upstream firm with that in the baseline
model, one can see that the former one is simply a multiple of the latter one. Therefore
the solution for W is the same, W CIT =

1+cup
.
2

Consequently, P CIT =

2+n(1+cup )
.
2(n+1)

Similarly, the same approach can be used to find the solutions under a GRT,
except that a GRT taxes the gross receipts instead of profits.

Therefore, firm

i solves the following problem:M ax[(1 − t)(1 − qi − q−i ) − W ]qi . The symmetric
qi

Cournot equilibrium is q

GRT

=

1−t−W
.
(n+1)(1−t)

The upstream firm then solves M ax[(1 −
W

t)W − cup ]nq GRT . Again, the objective function is just the multiple of the one in
the single firm case under a GRT; thus, W GRT =
1−n·

1−t
cup
− 2(1−t)
2

(1−t)(1+n)

.
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1−t
2

+

cup
.
2(1−t)

Hence, P GRT =

Comparing the results under the CIT with that under the GRT suggests that
Lemma 1 still hold since W CIT and W GRT are the same as in the monopoly case
and P GRT > P CIT (P GRT and P CIT are both monotonically decreasing in n and
P GRT > P CIT when n = 1). So the vertical integration argument is still applicable.
Further, comparing the difference in the profit per unit between the two tax
regimes yields:
up

up
1−t
c
− 2(1−t)
∂[(P GRT − W GRT ) − (P CIT − W CIT )]
∂(P GRT − P CIT )
1 12 − c 2
2
=
=
[
+
],
∂n
∂n
1 + n 1 + n (1 + n)(1 − t)

where the first and second terms in brackets are just the quantities under both tax
regimes. Hence,

∂[(P GRT −W GRT )−(P CIT −W CIT )]
∂n

> 0. Accordingly,

∂[q GRT −q CIT ]
∂n

< 0.

Therefore, if the percentage increase in per unit profit difference is greater than the
percentage decrease in the quantity difference, the profit shifting result holds.
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Table B.1: States with GRT-related Taxes
State
Delaware

Kentucky

Michigan

Ohio

Texas

Washington

Items Taxed
Gross receipts tax on all non-exempt goods or services rendered.
Rates range from 0.096 percent to 1.92 percent depending on
business activity, in addition to place-of-business fees ranging
from $25 to $75 per location:
• Manufacturers: 0.180 percent.
• Wholesalers: 0.307 percent.
• Retailers: 0.576 percent.
• Restaurants: 0.499 percent.
• Food Processors: 0.154 percent.
• Petroleum Products Wholesalers: 0.384 percent, plus a
hazardous substances tax of 0.9 percent, plus a surtax of 0.192
percent.
• Occupational/Professional/General Services: 0.384 percent.
• Additional rates for more specific industries.
Alternative minimum calculation for business taxes of 0.095
percent gross receipts or 0.750 percent of gross profits. Kentucky
school districts may levy a 3 percent gross receipts tax on utilities.
Michigan’s new business tax, the Michigan Business Tax, replaced
the Single Business Tax as the primary privilege tax effective
January 1, 2008. The Michigan Business Tax consists of two
individual taxes, a business income tax and a modified gross
receipts. State government is authorized to levy nine types of
business privilege taxes in Michigan, and local government is
authorized to levy one type of business privilege tax.
Commercial Activities Tax (CAT) enacted in 2005, to be
phased-in over a five-year period. When fully phased-in, rate is
0.26 percent of gross receipts. Imposed on all activity, legal or
illegal, that is conducted for or results in gain, profit, or income.
Utilities are taxed separately at 4.75 percent, except oil pipelines,
which are taxed at 6.75 percent.
Effective January 1, 2007: General gross receipts tax. Rate is 1
percent, calculated on the minimum of either a) total revenue
minus total cost of goods, or b) total revenue minus total
compensation and benefits. Wholesalers and retailers are taxed at
0.5 percent.
Business & Occupation (B&O) tax, the nation’s oldest general
gross receipts tax. Rates vary widely based on industry:
• Manufacturing Dairy Products: 0.138 percent.
• Travel Agent Commissions: 0.275 percent.
• Retailing: 0.471 percent.
• Wholesaling: 0.484 percent.
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• Manufacturing: 0.484 percent.
• Gambling Contests of Chance: 1.5 percent.
• Additional rates for more specific industries.
Source: Chamberlain and Fleenor (2006).
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